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The causes that control the historical movement of reality

The event acquires its realistic existence, which enables it to be the subject of knowledge, which is in fact knowledge of this reality that moves and determines it. Historical practice, in its scientific nature, is the exploration of this reality that carries the events, because it is their material base, that is, the actual soil in which they grow. In other words, the historical treatment of the event does not acquire its scientific character except by returning the event to its soil, which is its actual reality. History becomes a science when it becomes research, or consideration, into this reality and its qualities, that is, into



Its historical existence, and therefore, in the movement that carries it to the forms it has, or to the forms it becomes. History, as it is a science of the manner of events, is the science of this movement, that is, the science of the process of reality in its manner. Saying that historical knowledge is scientific, insofar as it is knowledge of the conditions of events - not insofar as it is informational knowledge of the sequence and succession of events - necessarily requires research into the causes of these conditions, that is, in

The causes that control the historical movement of reality.

Ibn Khaldun says: The science of history is “consideration and investigation.” In this statement, then, there is a rejection of history being narration or transmission

Informatively, and on the other hand, it demonstrates the necessity of theoretical construction in the process of scientific construction of history. (By theoretical construction here we mean the process of producing theoretical concepts through which the knowledge production process takes place.) It also shows the necessity of verifying the authenticity of the transmitted news. What was impossible within the scope of an empirical understanding of history has become a necessity within the scope of its scientific understanding. Thus, Ibn Khaldun opens a new continent of knowledge, by defining history in this way, in opposition to what history was before according to the predecessors.

Ibn Khaldun continues his definition of history, saying: It is “an explanation for beings and their principles,” and “a knowledge of the manner and causes of events.” On the surface, these two statements say one thing: the necessity of investigating the causes. Explaining is returning a thing to its cause, and its cause is a cause. But in fact, there is a slight difference between the two statements that has great cognitive importance. The second statement emphasizes the necessity of researching the causes of the movement of reality, while the first affirms the necessity of researching the reasons for the existence of this reality, or its principles, in the form in which it exists. This difference becomes clear when we understand that the reality that Ibn Khaldun is talking about is nothing but social reality


Himself. History, then, looks at the principles by which this reality exists, that is, at the basic conditions for the existence of the social whole, and at the causes of its movement and changes. Since these causes are within this social whole, and not outside it, it is necessary, in the beginning, to look at the structure of this whole and know the principles that control its internal interconnection that makes it a cohesive social whole, so that the historian can determine the reasons for its movement.

And its changes, therefore, of its historiography.

At the beginning of this research, we asked a question about the relationship between urban science and history, and now we are close to answering it. We anticipate the research and say that urbanization is the subject of history. Research into society, in its conditions and laws, is the subject of history, because history is not the movement of events, but rather the movement of facts, that is, the movement of the social whole, and because history - that is, historical practice - is therefore not an event report, that is, a transmission of events, but rather it is a factual report, and the reality is this, Necessarily, social. Although event reporting is a report, then factual (social) reporting is not a report or narration, and it cannot, in the first place, be